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Abstract — Focus of this paper is on ethical issues related to 
the era of Internet, e.g. cyberethics. Approach used in this 
paper is phenomenology, whereas definitions of cyberethics 
are discussed from the viewpoint of pragmatic ethics, while 
questioning existing basic values in society and proportion 
these into pragmatic, de facto ideology. Resulting comparison 
provides conceptual analysis on cyberethics as well as 
provides new perspectives on research on cyberethics. This 
paper demonstrates, that there exists a conflict between 
pragmatic and general moral law, which is foundational one.  
 
Keywords — Cyberethics, Virtuality, eSociety, Self 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on ethical issues closely related to the 
era of Internet, e.g. cyberethics. In this paper the authors a) 
provide a definition of cyberethics from the viewpoint of 
pragmatic ethics, and b) discuss certain basic values 
(democracy, freedom of speech, equity) and proportion 
these into pragmatic, de facto ideology. Resulting 
comparison will provide following contributions; a) 
conceptual analysis on cyberethics and b) new perspectives 
on cyberethics research. 
Methodologically this study is phenomenological one. 
According to Gilles Deleuze, philosophy is needed 
especially in situations, where new phenomena already 
exist, and both concepts and words are swaming in space. It 
is philosophy’s duty to clarify situation [1]. This study 
accepts the challenge proposed by Deleuze (as well as Félix 
Guattari) – after all, virtual reality is one metaphor for 
dimension like space. Phenomenological bracketing was 
chosen as a research method particularly because of “being 
behindhand” [2]. In phenomenology central concepts or 
phenomena are taken into consideration from different 
perspectives. It is quite obvious that for example concept 
“digital divide” has a number of meanings depending on 
chosen discipline, or viewpoint. In phenomenological 
reduction attempt to define significance and discipline 
becomes a systematic attempt on controlling chaos [3]. 
Defining the cyberethics is a cross-disciplinary project. 
Topic is related to such concepts as internet ethics, self 
regulation, game theory, plagiarism, trust and privacy, 
digital divide, professional ethics, surveillance and 
regulations related to freedom of speech, to name a few. 
These are very common topics in publications concentrated 
on internet ethics [4]-[8]. 
According to pragmatism, values are being tested all the 
time with reality [9]. This is to say that pragmatism does 
not accept any permanent values, and therefore it is suitable 
for describing virtual ethics and reality. Usually 
development in value hierarchies is slow, but sometimes it 
is surprisingly fast [10]. Pragmatism is also based on 
scientific optimism [11], where it can be said that pragmatic 
ethics reflects advances in IT. 
There is a common principle that applies on both Internet 
and information technology in general. As soon as a new 
technology is being introduced, everyone is eager to utilize 
it as soon as possible. There are no significant attempts in 
creating standards to follow, but instead solutions created 
by one vendor will quite soon become “de facto standards”. 
Application is being accepted by general public without 
being defined and accepted officially, because this would 
take too much time. 
Similar de facto –practice appears to exist in moral issues 
related to Internet. Moral codes are being molded and 
introduced taking only pragmatic issues into account. 
Actors are everything but professionals. A new moral is 
being created in Internet all the time; new virtual 
communities are being born all the time, and these form 
rules and practices, which depart greatly from commonly 
accepted ethical codes in society. From ethical viewpoint 
this phenomenon is interesting – it appears that everything 
is happening faster in Internet [12]. Pragmatism is suitable 
way for describing the development of Internet, all de facto 
practices, which are being measured based on their 
suitability alone. Likewise, the concept of self regulation is 
more than applicable with pragmatic ethics. 
Self regulation creates ethical codes while at the same 
time influences existing regulations, norms taking shape. 
This type of action is very Hobbesian by nature. There 
exists pragmatic de facto ideology behind self regulation. A 
justified question stated is: what basic values self regulation 
takes into account and which it chooses to ignore? One 
could argue that binding moral values into consequences of 
actions is basically simplifying ethics. Ethics, which studies 
consequences (pragmatism, de facto), aims to be able to 
estimate and evaluate consequences of actions. Thus 
everything is measured in money (or by effectiviness).  
When considering possible consequences of action and 
compatibility with existing moral law, for example violence 
provided by Internet does not gain amnesty – even in cases 
where a proof about caused damages can not be given [13]. 
In this study authors analyze chosen basic values 
(democracy, freedom of speech, equity) and proportion 
these to pragmatic de facto ideology. As a result, this study 
provides a comparison which illuminates a) basic concepts 
in detail, and b) opens new perspectives for research in 
cyberethics. Authors will demonstrate that there exists a 
conflict between pragmatic and general moral law, which is 
foundational one. Explanatory power of pragmatism is 
greater though. 
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II. METHOD 
Phenomenology can be called eidetics, which means that 
it is possible with the assistance of the eidetic reduction to 
reach the essence of the things and phenomena [14]. In his 
earlier studies Edmund Husserl (The Idea of 
Phenomenology) [15] claims that the universal is seen in 
the individual. The move from the individual intuition to 
the grasp of the universal is a move to grasp the essence. 
Husserl calls this “method” eidetic intuition. Husserl 
believed that it was possible to have an insight into the 
essential nature of things. He argued that these essences 
could be seen in a manner analogous to perceptual seeing 
of a physical object [16]. This eidetic seeing is what 
Husserl calls seeing essence or essential seeing. 
The traditional phenomenological method turns 
problematic when cyberethics is defined. In our opinion 
cyberethics is not a concept or an idea but an ongoing 
dynamic process that is almost impossible to grasp by 
means of a model, for instance. Things that are changing 
irregularly all the time can be handled in the same way as 
Zeno tried to deny the motion. In his aporia or paradox 
about the arrow that never gets to the target Zeno claimed 
that at any point in time a moving object must be at rest 
[17]. That’s how the models are constructed, they require 
an infinite amount of “rest positions”, whereas we suppose 
that cyberethics is an entity that is changing all the time. 
How is it possible then to define such a phenomenon? We 
need to take an ontological standpoint. We don’t ask what 
cyberethics is but how it is. The crucial question is how 
cyberethics exists? 
When defining cyberethics we are not trying to gain the 
essence of the concept but the meaning of it.  As E. D. 
Hirsch states, an interpretive hypothesis is ultimately a 
probability judgement that is supported by evidence [18]. 
When defining cyberethics, the researchers are actually 
interpreting the society and the cultural strata of it. We are 
in the middle of the life flow all the time, which means that 
we are only able to understand the factual reality, in other 
words we are commuting between two existential 
categories, the actual projects and the factual reality. [19] - 
[20]. When an individual is interpreting his own life, he is 
actually moving in the same way as the life itself. Husserl 
calls the life-world the ultimate horizon of all human 
achievement. As conscious beings the individuals always 
inhabit the life-world. It is pregiven in advance and 
experienced as a unity. It is the general structure that allows 
objectivity.  
We are in the life-world and at the same time we are 
interpreting a particular area of it, i.e. the virtual reality and 
the values – the cyberethics. The results of our research 
depend on the standpoints that we have taken – in practice 
it is impossible to occupy all the possible viewpoints. 
That’s why we have to be content with the probability in 
our research – we aspire to give an account of the 
cyberethics as it is seen in this phase of our culture and 
civilization. The result of the phenomenological project is 
always the insight of the phenomenon and the description 
of this insight. 
III. THE ETERNAL RETURN IN CYBERETHICS – 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH  
The history of mankind is filled with myths of eternal 
return (Spengler, Nietzsche, Antics, Christianity etc.). But 
it is not only in mythology and fairy tales that this theme is 
constantly repeated. It is possible to find the same model in 
science, too. In his book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962) Thomas Kuhn presents the idea that 
science does not progress via a linear accumulation of new 
knowledge, but instead undergoes periodic revolutions 
which he calls "paradigm shifts", in which the nature of 
scientific inquiry within a particular field is abruptly 
transformed [21]. The paradigmatic shifts are preceded by 
periods of stagnation. The progress of science, as Kuhn 
describes it, can be seen in a circular way, the scientific 
revolution always returns, it had to take place. 
The same phenomenon can be seen in the products of all 
creative activities. The creative periods are always followed 
by stagnation and institutionalization. The corresponding 
development is to be discerned in all social, cultural and 
technical phenomena – and in the arts [22]. Many of the 
cultural structures and phenomena can be seen and 
described with the help of the eternal return (repetition) 
[23]. 
The same concerns the Internet. Upon the introduction of 
Internet, many pioneers of the information age had high 
hopes for it. Maybe the Internet didn’t fulfil those 
expectations. People were talking about increased 
democracy and freedom, better possibilities in all social 
participation and communication and so forth, basically 
about about the democratic values. Jürgen Habermas says 
in his theory of discourse ethics that there is a 
communicative void in the society. The more people and 
institutions communicate in a society, the more efficiently 
democracy is working. [24] The Internet should fill this 
communicative void. This also means that the Internet 
could be socially valuable, positive value. But the Internet 
is constantly changing; it is a dynamic communication 
environment. According to Habermas the bourgeoisie, 
when it had taken the power, began immediately to work up 
the public sphere, where communication takes place, in the 
favour of its own interests. There prevails only one truth in 
that kind of society. The Internet, on the contrary, 
represents pluralism, competition between different 
opinions and genuine free public debate [25].Economical 
interest, commercialism and the commercial media threaten 
free communication. According to Habermas these do not 
belong to the area of free communication, nor do the 
administrative organisations. In the early days of the 
Internet there was no commercialism and as little 
administration as possible. Lee Salter, a Habermas 
researcher, says that the Internet grows apart all the time 
from those ideals of free communication which were so 
typical of it in the beginning. The government uses the 
Internet more and more for administrative and 
propagandistic aims, and they are trying to use the Internet 
as a means to control citizens. The ideal of Internet 
communication was interactivity in the beginning, whereas 
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communication has recently become more and more one-
sided or non-communicative. [26] Deborah G. Johnson 
claims that commercial interests have all the time 
increasing their influence on the development of the 
Internet. This is based on the fact that free market forces 
have realized that the Internet is an important and efficient 
tool and media [27] and have taken over it. 
Democracy was one of the great ideals in the pioneering 
times of the Internet. (Yoneji Masuda and the computopia, 
1972) [28]. Like other positive values it was like an 
impetus or a driving force that put the Internet’s 
development in motion. But as it is with all the ideals and 
beautiful values, they do not flourish in reality. Many on 
the NSMs (New social movements) make use of the 
Internet when communicating. Internet is cheap, fast, 
interactive and offers possibilities to anonymity. But these 
movements that operate underground or outside the control 
of the society are often organisationally antidemocratic. 
[29] So it is possible to see the model of the eternal return 
here, too. It means the fall of free, progressive forces and 
the victory of institutionalization and stagnation. 
The faster the Internet and ICT are growing and 
developing, the better has become the methods of 
controlling the citizens. Panopticon, Michel Foucault’s all-
embracing metaphor telling about and describing the 
official horror and terror, has finally been realized [30]. At 
the same time when the Internet makes the communication 
between individuals run smoothly, it gives the public 
administration and terrorists (hackers etc.) a comparable 
and as efficient a tool to supervise and sort people, to 
invade citizens’ privacy. With the assistance of figure and 
face recognition it is possible to pick up persons from an 
anonymous mass and build up their virtual identities that 
has little to do with the real personae. Is the effective way 
of controlling people valuable in one way or the other? Of 
course, if we think of the public administration, 
bureaucracy and all the overseeing authorities (the police, 
the customs, security services or tax authorities), the 
efficient monitoring is a useful phenomenon. [31] The 
question is about the balance between privacy and thrust. 
The more the public takes over the area of personal 
privacy, the more the citizens feel anxious and defend 
against the intrusion [32]. But at the same time the area of 
free communication is threatened. Here the freedom and 
effectiveness are fighting against each other. When 
defining the valuable, we must decide which viewpoint we 
choose – this is one of the main questions in 
phenomenology. Are we obliged to take a stand? Are we 
going to evaluate the effectiveness from the point of view 
of the authorities, or are we going to take a stand on 
citizens’ favor? It is here, where the question about 
different ethical theories comes along. 
IV. PRAGMATISM AND DE FACTO ETHICS 
Is pragmatism the best possible ethical theory suitable 
for cyberethics? Pragmatism explains technical 
development and progress in moral well but when justice is 
taken into account, pragmatism is not the best possible 
explanatory model. Pragmatism emphasizes the importance 
of activity in human life. Pihlström says that although the 
scientific worldview would not be the best possible (to the 
mankind), we can make the world a better place to live in 
through our active work [33]. In addition to optimism 
William James’s and John Dewey’s pragmatism 
emphasized development and change, that is why it suits 
well the world of information technology. According to 
pragmatism, values are being tested all the time with reality 
[34]. This is to say that pragmatism does not accept any 
permanent values, and therefore it is suitable for describing 
virtual ethics and reality. The norms exist in relation to the 
surroundings, they are context bound. The individual 
reactions against the value hierarchy can change it. Usually 
development in value hierarchies is slow, but sometimes it 
is surprisingly fast.   
The moral action is not only the adaptation of moral 
rules, because the moral principles are suppositions or 
hypothesis, which have to be tested constantly. They must 
fulfill certain qualifications or requirements and they are 
open for changes. When we test moral rules we also 
interpret them. Legal system and legislation are good 
examples: The judges not only adapt the law but they also 
interpret it because they so often had to do with precedents 
without applications.  
According to pragmatism things don’t have any values, 
they are value neutral. After all, pragmatism accepts value 
hierarchy. But this hierarchy is not a permanent one. Why 
don’t we think likewise about the Internet? It is possible to 
measure the usefulness of the Internet and we can call the 
result of the measurement the utility of the Internet.  Now 
we are very near consequentialism, which, as its name 
suggests, is the view where normative properties depend 
only on consequences. This general approach can be 
applied on different levels to different normative properties 
of different kinds of things, but the most prominent 
example is consequentialism about the moral rightness of 
acts, which claims that whether an act is morally right 
depends only on the consequences of that act or of 
something related to that act, such as the motive behind the 
act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind. 
The pragmatic moral bound to consequences is an easy 
way to describe the Internet and the fast technological 
advance. Many of the traditional pragmatists agree on the 
idea that everything, also the moral arguments, can be 
measured. The argument “Violence is unethical” can be 
tested as well as any other proposition. 
Immanuel Kant argued that moral requirements are based 
on a standard of rationality. Kant called this rule the 
Categorical Imperative. It is one of the main clauses of the 
deontological normative ethical theory. According to Kant 
we are acting in a certain way because we have different 
kinds of duties towards ourselves and others. This may 
appear strange to the adherent of pragmatism. 
Edmund Husserl held an interesting lecture on ethics in 
Vienna in 1935. [35] The highest ethical goal of the 
rational culture and civilization is its spontaneous and self-
steered improvement. In the same way as a rational 
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individual is able to evaluate and study his practical goals, 
so can a whole culture. European (or western) culture is 
therefore able to direct its future itself.  According to 
Husserl there are ideal absolute goals, as well as ethical, 
that can never be gained or fulfilled totally, but they are 
something worth aiming at. Here Husserl comes near 
Immanuel Kant’s regulative principle. These aims and the 
relationship of the European civilization to these goals can 
be evaluated over and over again, and this is the strength of 
the rational European civilization. Edmund Husserl doesn’t 
name precisely what these goals may be, but it is highly 
probable that the idea of equality could be among these 
definitive aims. [36] As T. Miettinen states, equality in a 
society can’t be described quantitatively or geometrically. 
Nevertheless, we understand what it means. We are able to 
evaluate our activity in proportion to this goal even though 
we can never achieve it. Although it is out of our reach, it 
determines our activities and choice. [37] This means that 
we are trying to achieve equality, for instance, over and 
over again. This project originates (socially) from French 
Revolution in 1789 and is still going on. The original 
Internet enterprise (ARPANET) in the 1970s was based on 
this kind of noble ideals (democracy, equality, non-
commercialism, free speech and communication), but as 
Deborah Johnson stated, these pioneering dreams have 
been crushed. Control has taken over and because of 
commercialism there is no democracy, equality or area for 
free communication, to put it simply [38]. However, these 
goals or absolute ideals do still exist and are waiting for the 
new evaluation, as Husserl said. Husserl speaks about 
reappraisal and new beginning, but on a very universal 
level. 
Pragmatism is based on so called de facto ethics, and it 
easily neglects values like democracy and equality. Profit, 
surplus, effective use of time, logistics, effectiveness, price 
and usefulness are some of the “values” typical of the de 
facto pragmatism. But it is not so simple. If pragmatists get 
an assignment that consists of the development of Internet 
democracy, they certainly accomplish it, without thinking 
of the meaning of the word democracy.  According to 
Husserl, the civilization is in crisis when the pragmatic 
science dominates. To solve this crisis Husserl invites 
rational thinking [39]. 
How to define de facto pragmatism? In the introduction 
we compared it with de facto standards. As soon as a new 
technology is being introduced, everyone is eager to utilize 
it as soon as possible. There are no significant attempts to 
create standards that should be followed, but instead, the 
solutions created by one vendor will quite soon become “de 
facto standards”. Application is being accepted by general 
public without being defined and accepted officially, 
because this would take too much time. 
Similar de facto –practice appears to exist in moral issues 
related to the Internet. Moral codes are being molded and 
taken into use taking only pragmatic issues into account. 
Actors are everything but professional. A new moral is 
being created in the Internet all the time; new virtual 
communities are being born all the time, and these form 
rules and practices, which differ greatly from commonly 
accepted ethical codes in the society. From the ethical 
viewpoint this phenomenon is interesting – it appears that 
everything is happening faster in the Internet.  
There are many causes behind this de facto practice. 
Husserl would say that it depends on the triumphal march 
of the applied sciences. Deborah Johnson would probably 
say that the American domination in the Internet is the main 
cause (Pragmatism has always been American philosophy). 
We think there are other reasons, too. Attitude education 
has certainly good possibilities to clarify the ethical 
background of the Internet. It is certainly necessary, 
because we all want to be sure that the Internet is going to 
be working smoothly in the future, and a fair, righteous and 
democratic Internet is reality. But because of the times we 
are living in, some of the typical Internet principles 
(anonymity) and the internationalization/globalization, are 
not that easy to carry out in reality. 
V. SELF-REGULATION AS A HOBBESIAN 
ENTERPRISE 
European Union has started a project, where great 
emphasis is on the encouragement for self-regulation of the 
Internet. The Safer Internet plus programme aims at 
promoting safer use of the Internet and new online 
technologies, particularly for children, and at fighting 
against illegal contents and contents unwanted by the end-
user, as part of a coherent approach by the European 
Union. [40] 
Behind self-regulation is a desire to promote the 
functioning of the same set of values and professional 
ethics. S. Visala states that when the Internet crossed the 
borders of the scientific community and became a 
commercial and civic enterprise, the whole gamut of human 
activities and interests came along. Money, flaming, 
plagiarism, copying of data files etc. finished the well 
working self-regulation. [41]  
A classical example of self-regulation is the Leviathan of 
Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679). Hobbes described the 
society that had plunged into anarchy. In such a society the 
inhabitants can’t predict or make plans for the future. 
Unable to rely indefinitely on their individual powers in the 
effort to secure livelihood and contentment, Hobbes 
supposed, human beings join together in the formation of a 
commonwealth. Thus, the commonwealth as a whole 
embodies a network of associated contracts and provides 
for the highest form of social organization. On Hobbes's 
view, the formation of the commonwealth creates a new, 
artificial person (the Leviathan) to whom all responsibility 
for social order and public welfare is entrusted. [42] 
Leviathan was written during the English Civil War; much 
of the book is occupied with demonstrating the necessity of 
a strong central authority to avoid the evil of discord and 
civil war. The war or anarchy can be compared with the 
Internet, where there is are executive or legislative bodies. 
Patricia Wallace has stated that the Internet and the co-
operative groups work effectively and without quarrel or 
contradictions, if they are homogenous [43]. In this respect 
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the Internet is full of paradoxes. Globalization shrinks the 
world and spreads the Internet, but simultaneously the 
amount of potential troublemakers increases [44].  
The Safer Internet project has listed ways to increase the 
functioning of the Internet with the help of self-regulation. 
There are certainly many technical devices. But the most 
important way to improve the working of the net is to 
increase education and enlightenment. This will also 
improve self-regulation [45]. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
It is obvious that the principles of virtual ethics 
(cyberethics) can be drawn from traditional ethics. On the 
other hand, according to the idea presented by Intona [46], 
electronic mediation is inducing a sense of hyperreality into 
our world, thus vitiating our ethical sense of being. Then 
again, Hobbesian Leviathan tells us how the development 
from an anarchistic state goes on voluntarily towards 
working operational environments. Here the acquired 
benefit is bigger than the other values, such as freedom, 
excitement or possibility to make big and quick profits.  
There are some special features which are typical for the 
Internet, which may inhibit the development of solid 
sustainable ethical code. One of these characteristics is the 
fast growth and the hectic nature of the Internet. This is 
why the concept of de facto ethics is so well suited to 
describe the real ethical meaning of cyberethics – or is it 
better to call it a non-ethical theory (a theory that describes 
practical activity) that defines only technical, goal-oriented 
activity or goal rationality.  
According to Beck [47], the social production of wealth 
systematically goes hand in hand with the social production 
of risks. According to him [48], risks and the potential of 
self-threat have been unleashed on a hitherto unprecedented 
scale as a consequence of the exponential growth in the 
forces of production as the process of modernization 
continues. This is a place for a well founded question: How 
can ethical discussion take place, when the consequences 
of possible risks are well beyond comprehension? Husserl 
explains convincingly how the ethical principles in a 
community “ought” to work. Husserl’s observer, or 
scientist (philosopher), is situated in the middle of the life 
flow, bound to the historicity and lifeworlds, and somehow 
he is able to outline the ethical condition of the culture. 
Husserl’s idea that we have to redeem our ethical goals 
over and over again can be seen as a well-defined comment 
against pragmatism and de facto ethics. 
De facto ethics and pragmatism don’t operate on the 
same level with traditional ethics or ethical code. There are 
no distinct and unquestionable principles in pragmatism; 
efficiency, usability and fastness can be seen as one of the 
main criteria to the activity of good quality (valuable). But 
it might be so that sometimes it would be useful to study 
the ethical foundations of all the activities in a society. 
Husserl’s ideas bring ethical content to the non-ethical 
environments.  
Husserl’s idea about the revaluation of ethical code, 
goals that had to be evaluated over and over again, is based 
on the idea of western rationality, but it certainly conflicts 
with the ideas of freedom in the different sectors of the 
society. De facto ethics explains the factual situation in a 
society that is getting more and more technical all the time. 
Self-regulation on the other side is a typical way of trying 
to get the Internet function. Because of Internet’s 
voluntarily character that has not always been very 
successful. Many of the different self-regulation projects 
(The Safer Internet project, information literacy, rules of 
the computer games) have improved the functionality of at 
least some of the Internet environments. In self-regulation 
we can see some kind of eternal return to the times when 
the pioneer spirit of the Internet was dominant. 
De facto ethics makes it possible to describe the factual 
ethical situation in the Internet; traditional ethics tells us 
how it should or could be. If we give priority to values like 
freedom, democracy and equality, there is certainly a big 
difference between the factual situation and the absolute 
ideas (ideals, natural values, as described in traditional 
ethics). The problem in this kind of evaluation is the 
definition of the absolute values which is important in 
quantitative research and is called operationalisation: in 
ethics it is extremely difficult to answer the question “How 
do I measure what I am interested in studying?”. 
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